

Message Text

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FOR COVEY FROM S/PRS

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TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: PRESS REVIEW, JANUARY 2, 1977

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS:

NEW YORK TIMES:

1. U.S. SAYS 6 NATIONS CURB HUMAN RIGHTS, GWERTZMAN,
THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MAKING ITS
FIRST DETAILED REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS ABROAD,

HAS FOUND THAT ARGENTINA, HAITI, INDONESIA, IRAN, PERU AND
THE PHILIPPINES HAVE VIOLATED HUMAN RIGHTS TO VARYING
DEGREES BUT SHOULD NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE AMERI-
CAN MILITARY SUPPORT.

THE REPORTS, MADE PUBLIC TONIGHT BY THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL
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RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WERE SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT AT
THE COMMITTEE'S REQUEST. THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR REPORTS
ON ONLY THOSE SIX COUNTRIES AS AN INITIAL TEST OF COM-
PLIANCE WITH A NEW CONGRESSIONAL LAW MANDATING SUCH HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORTS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHEN ASKED FOR BY
ANY MEMBER OF CONGRESS.

LAST YEAR, SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER REFUSED
TO COMPLY WITH AN EARLIER CONGRESSIONAL LAW REQUIRING A
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS A
MEANS OF JUDGING WHETHER FOREIGN AID SHOULD BE GRANTED. HE

ARGUED THAT SUCH PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ONLY CAUSED PROBLEMS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, WERE UNFAIR TO AMERICAN ALLIES, AND DID LITTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

IN THE NEW FOREIGN AID BILL THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS WAS STIFFENED. BUT AT FIRST, THE DEPARTMENT SUBMITTED THE REQUESTED SIX REPORTS IN A CLASSIFIED FORM THAT BARRED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO REDUCE EMBARRASSMENT TO THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS. BUT THE REPORTS WERE DECLASSIFIED LAST WEEK WHEN THE COMMITTEE PROTESTED....

BUT REPRESENTATIVE DONALD M. FRASER, DEMOCRAT OF MINNESOTA, WHO WAS A DRIVING FORCE TO SECURE THE REPORTS, SAID TODAY THAT THE REPORTS "ARE A LOT BETTER THAN I THOUGHT THEY'D BE," ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THE LANGUAGE WAS OFTEN TOO SOFT....

THERE ARE FEW STARTLING SURPRISES IN THE REPORTS. MOST COUNTRIES INVOLVED HAVE BEEN ACCUSED BY MANY ORGANIZATIONS IN RECENT YEARS OF VARIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND MANY ARTICLES HAVE APPEARED IN THE PRESS ABOUT THEM.

INDEED, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO REDUCE DIRECT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE REPORTS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT UNCLASSIFIED

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MENT OFTEN QUOTED AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AS A SOURCE, THE ORGANIZATION THAT PUBLICIZES ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST POLITICAL PRISONERS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE VIOLATIONS IN THE SIX COUNTRIES UNDER STUDY, IT BELIEVED AMERICAN MILITARY AID AND MILITARY SALES SHOULD BE CONTINUED FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS...

(THE REMAINDER OF THE ARTICLE IS A SYNOPSIS OF THE REPORT.)

WASHINGTON POST

2. CARTER TO INHERIT INTENSE DISPUTE ON SOVIET INTENTIONS, MURREY MARDER. PRESIDENT-ELECT JIMMY CARTER WILL INHERIT AN INTENSE DISPUTE OVER U. S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF THE SOVIET UNION'S GLOBAL STRATEGY.

THE NEW ESTIMATE OF LONG-RANGE SOVIET MILITARY INTENTIONS IS ACCOMPANIED BY EXCEPTIONAL CONTROVERSY. IT GOES BEYOND THE USUAL DEBATE OVER ASSESSING SECRET EVIDENCE GATHERED BY SATELLITE, SUBMARINE, RADIO LISTENING POSTS, AND OTHER METHODS FOR GAUGING THE ACCURACY AND PRODUCTION RATES OF SOVIET WEAPONRY.

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 26 YEARS, A SPECIAL PANEL WAS COMMISSIONED TO CHALLENGE THE JUDGMENT OF THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT ANALYSTS. THE SPECIAL GROUP ARGUED THAT THE TRADITIONAL ESTIMATORS FOR YEARS HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY MISCALCULATING THE BASIC INTENTIONS OF THE KREMLIN, AND UNDERSTATING THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES.

THE RESULT IS A NEW, STERNER NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THE SOVIET UNION. SUPPORTERS OF THE ADVERSARY PROCESS CLAIM IT IS A "MORE REALISTIC" PROJECTION OF THE SOVIET THREAT OVER THE NEXT 10 YEARS. CRITICS CHARGE THAT UNCLASSIFIED

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IT IS A FLAWED PRODUCT, WITH ITS OBJECTIVITY IMPAIRED BY "OUTSIDE PRESSURE." ...

(ARTICLEGOES ON TO LIST MEMBERSHIP OF COMPETING GROUPS OF INSIDE ESTIMATORS--TEAM A--AND OUTSIDE ESTIMATORS--TEAM B.)

IT WAS ONLY LAST WEEK THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT BEGAN TO STUDY THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE NEW NIE, AND ALSO A PANEL. THE LATTER IS DESCRIBED AS A MORE PESSIMISTIC ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND A STRONG CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT METHOD OF EVALUATING INTELLIGENCE.

THERE IS SPECULATION THAT BUSH'S SUCCESSOR IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, THEODORE C. SORENSEN, WILL NOW SEE THE DISPUTE AS ADDED REASON FOR OVERHAULING THE INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION STRUCTURE.

EVEN IF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DISAGREES WITH THE NEW NIE ON SOVIET STRATEGY, HOWEVER, IT CANNOT BE READILY REWRITTEN. IT WILL APPEAR IN TWO TO THREE VOLUMES THAT SERVE AS A REFERENCE FOR POLICY MAKERS ACROSS THE TOP ECHELON OF THE GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH MANY ARE NOT BOUND BY IT.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT REITERATES THAT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS LAST WEEK. IT SAID NIES "REPRESENT THE COLLECTIVE JUDGMENT OF THE AGENCIES MAKING UP THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD, SUCH AS SOVIET

STRATEGIC FORCES AND OBJECTIVES". BUT THEY "NEVER CONTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U. S. POLICY ALTERNATIVES" AND "WOULD NOT IN THEMSELVES NECESSARILY LEAD TO SELECTION OF A PARTICULAR POLICY OPTION."

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SOURCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DISPUTE AGREE THAT THE NEW, OFFICIAL NIE WILL RECORD THAT THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS TO BE DRIVING MORE THAN EVER TOWARD MILITARY SUPERIORITY, BEYOND EQUALITY OR PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE TERMS ARE THEMSELVES IN PRECISE AND DISPUTED, HOWEVER.

THIS WOULD BE THE TREND OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE IN ANY EVENT, OFFICIALS SAY DURING THE PAST YEAR, SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER HELPED TO RAISE THE ALARM ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS, ALTHOUGH HE CHAMPIONS U.S. SOVIET DETENTE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL TALKS.

SOME OF KISSINGER'S ASSOCIATES MAINTAIN, THEREFORE, THAT THEY SEE NOTHING "SURPRISINGLY NEW" OR "EVEN UNEXPECTED" IN HIS NEW OFFICIAL ESTIMATE.

BUT THE CHALLENGE THAT WAS MOUNTED IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS CAME FROM CRITICS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT WHO SAW KISSINGER AND HIS POLICIES AS A PRIME TARGET. AS A RESULT, MANY INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS AGREE, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM USED IN MAKING THE NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE CLEARLY STIFFENED THE OFFICIAL PROJECTION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.

AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE NEW NIE, PLUS THE PIPES REPORT, PLUS THE ENCOURAGEMENT GIVEN TO PESSIMISTS OR "WORST CASE" THEORISTS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT, IS REGARDED AS A HIGHER BARRIER FOR THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO OVERCOME TO CARRY OUT ITS OWN BROADER OBJECTIVES FOR U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL....

(REMAINDER OF ARTICLE EXCEPT FOR NEXT EXCERPT CONCENTRATES PRIMARILY ON REPORTED REMARKS OF GEN. GRAHAM AND RICHARD PIPES (TEAM B).)

IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT PRESIDENT FORD, NATIONAL SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED

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AFFAIRS ADVISER GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, OR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ADVISER WILLIAM G. HYLAND ANTICIPATED THE SCOPE OF THE UNDERLYING CHALLENGE THAT WOULD EMERGE IN WHICH WAS PLANNED AS AN EXPERIMENT "IN METHODOLOGY" ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATING.

ONE SOURCE SAID THAT WHAT WAS AUTHORIZED WAS "AN EXPERIMENTAL PROCESS FOR SHARPENING DEBATE AND ISSUES" THROUGH USE OF OUTSIDE PANELISTS, WHO MANAGED TO EXPAND THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT CONSIDERABLY. THIS SOURCE SAID "THIS WHOLE THING WAS RUN BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY," AND THAT THE WHITE HOUSE, AND KISSINGER DID NOT TRY TO KEEP ABREAST OF IT.

3. IBEX: DEADLY SYMBOL OF U. S. ARMS SALES PROBLEMS, BOB WOODWARD. ON AUGUST 28, 1976, THREE AMERICAN EMPLOYEES OF ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP. WERE SHOT TO DEATH IN TEHRAN, THE CAPITAL OF IRAN.

RICHARD M. HELMS, WHO WAS THEN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AND WHO FORMERLY WAS DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DESCRIBED THE KILLINGS IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH ANOTHER AMERICAN THREE DAYS LATER

(ARTICLE GIVES HELMS DESCRIPTION)

THE NEWSPAPERS REPORTED THE OFFICIAL EXPLANATION: THE KILLINGS WERE THE WORK OF ISLAMIC MOSLEM TERRORISTS.

BUT THREE DAYS LATER THE SHAH OF IRAN WAS TELLING A DIFFERENT STORY TO AN AMERICAN WHO VISITED HIM AT 11 A.M. FOR A 45-MINUTE AUDIENCE AT HIS LAVISH SUMMER PALACE.

"THE RUSSIANS," THE SHAH TOLD HIS VISITOR, "WERE BEHIND THIS INCIDENT AS WELL AS (A) PREVIOUS MILITARY ONE."

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TWO HOURS LATER HELMS TOLD THE SAME AMERICAN HE AGREED WITH THE SHAH.

THE THREE VICTIMS OF THE TERRORIST ATTACK WERE WORKING ON A SECRET PROJECT OF TRULY BUCK ROGERS PROPORTIONS CALLED IBEX. THE NAME WAS MENTIONED IN THE NEWS AND THEN FADED.

IBEX. IT IS A CODE NAME FOR A \$500 MILLION SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FOR THE BORDERS OF IRAN.

BUT IT IS ALSO A SYMBOL OF THE DANGERS AND PROBLEMS AND CORRUPTIONS THAT HAVE AFFLICTED THE U.S. ARMS SALE PROGRAM IN IRAN AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.

IBEX WAS BEGUN TWO YEARS AGO--AN ATTEMPT TO APPLY THE VERY BEST OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY TO THE SHAH'S DESIRE TO GATHER

INTELLIGENCE ABOUT HIS NEIGHBORS THROUGH ELECTRONIC AND PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEILLANCE.

ON THE FACE OF IT, IT COULD HAVE BEEN A STRAIGHTFORWARD BUSINESS DEAL BETWEEN ROCKWELL AND THE SHAH. BUT AS THE PLANS HAVE EVOLVED, THE PLOT HAS THICKENED AND BECOME PERHAPS HOPELESSLY TANGLED:

ITEM: ROCKWELL AGREES TO PAY A SECRET AGENT'S FEE OF

\$4.5 MILLION TO A MAIL DROP ON BERMUDA--POST OFFICE BOX
1179, REID HOUSE.

ITEM: SOME PAYMENTS TO THE MAIL DROP ARE FORWARDED TO
A MR. TURRETINI, CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, 63 RUE DE RHONE,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

ITEM: THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN DEPOSITS \$5 MILLION IN THE
RIGGS NATIONAL BANK IN WASHINGTON FOR "PAYMENT ON DEMAND"
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BY SIGNATURE OF MR. WILLIAM OWENS AND MR. HENRY PLASTEE."
OWENS AND PLASTEE WORK FOR THE CIA.

ITEM: DONALD PATTERSON, A FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE, IS PAID
\$55,000 TO AUTHORIZE PAYMENTS OF \$1.1 MILLION TO AN
AUDITING FIRM, TOUCHE ROSS AND CO. THIS IN TURN TRIGGERS
PAYMENTS TO U.S. DEFENSE CONTRACTORS FROM ANOTHER \$47
MILLION DEPOSITED AT THE RIGGS BANK BY IRAN.

ITEM: HELMS SENDS A HANDWRITTEN NOTE TO CIA DIRECTOR
GEORGE BUSH REQUESTING THAT A TOP CIA OFFICIAL COME TO
IRAN TO HEAR A SERIES OF ALLEGATIONS ABOUT CORRUPT
PRACTICES.

ITEM: FIFTEEN CIA EMPLOYEES IN IRAN, OPERATING UNDER
COVER AS THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY TEAM (USAT) DRAW UP
AND EXPAND PLANS FOR THE SOPHISTICATED AND AUTOMATED
INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING SYSTEM.

THESE ARE ALL ELEMENTS IN THE IBEX STORY. THE ARRANGE-
MENTS ARE NOT UNIQUE. THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT KNOWS THE
MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR U. S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES PRO-
GRAM IN IRAN IS WILDLY OUT OF CONTROL. THE CIA KNOWS.
THE IRANIANS, FROM THE SHAH ON DOWN, KNOW.

THEY ALL CONDEMN IT. THEY ISSUE DIRECTIVES AND COMMANDS
TO STOP IT, TO SLOW IT DOWN, TO BRING SOME ORDER TO IT.
BUT THE PRACTICE PERSISTS.

DOCUMENTS RECENTLY OBTAINED BY THE WASHINGTON POST
SPELL THIS OUT IN DETAIL. THEY INCLUDE SECRET AGREE-
MENTS FOR PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED AGENTS' FEES, SECRET
MESSAGES TO THE PENTAGON FROM THE SHAH, OFFICIAL LAMENTS,
COMPLAINTS AND ALLEGATIONS. THE DOCUMENTS INCLUDE DOZENS
OF MEMOS REPORTING ON THE PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS OF THE
SHAH, HIS TOP GENERALS AND AMBASSADOR HELMS.
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U. S. ARMS MERCHANDISING IN IRAN--ABOUT \$10.4 BILLION

IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS--HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SEVERE PUBLIC CRITICISM. BUT THESE DOCUMENTS SHOW IT IS IN MUCH WORSE SHAPE THAN PUBLICLY REPORTED.

THE IBEX PROJECT IS A CASE STUDY IN THE KIND OF INTRIGUE AND UNDER-THE-TABLE DEALING WHICH, ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. ARMS MERCHANDISING PROGRAM. THE STORY BEGINS IN EARLY 1974....

(ARTICLE GOES ON TO DESCRIBE ROCKWELL'S USE OF UNITED AERO SERVICES COMPANY AS AGENT IN VIOLATION OF GENERAL TOUFANIAN'S DIRECTIVES.)

THE EPISODE WITH UASCO AND THE FORBIDDEN AGENT'S FEE IS MERELY ONE OF THE STRANGE MONEY TRANSACTIONS SURROUNDING THE IBEX DEAL.

OTHERS INVOLVE THE RIGGS NATIONAL BANK AND THE CIA.

IT HAS BECOME A STANDARD PRACTICE ON "COVERT" PROJECTS, SUCH AS IBEX, TO HIDE OR INSULATE SOME OF THE PAYMENTS THAT GO OUT TO U. S. CONTRACTORS. THIS IS DONE IN THE INTERESTS OF SECRECY.....

(ARTICLE GOES ON TO DESCRIBE PAYMENTS PROCESS.)

PROBLEMS OF GREATER MAGNITUDE HAVE SINCE SURFACED. THEY INVOLVE ALLEGATIONS OF WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION OF THE PROJECT AND GRAVE DOUBTS THAT THE IBEX SYSTEM IS NECESSARY OR WILL EVER WORK.

AMBASSADOR HELMS CAPSULIZED THE SITUATION DURING JULY, 1976, IN A HANDWRITTEN NOTE TO CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH. A MEMO OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HELMS AND AN AMERICAN UNCLASSIFIED

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VISITOR IN TEHRAN RECORDS HELMS' ATTITUDE:

"AMBASSADOR INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE HAD COMPLETELY WASHED HIS HANDS OF IBEX. HE HAD CALLED A VERY SENIOR CIA MAN FROM WASHINGTON TO COME CHECK ON IT. HE HAD HIM SIT

DOWN AND TAKE NOTES OF ALL CHARGES AND ALLEGATIONS HE HAD HEARD. HE THEN TOLD THIS MAN HE WAS TOTALLY WASHING HIS HANDS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY. IT WOULD ALL REST ON CIA-- IF IT FAILED IT WAS GOING TO BLOW UP ON THEM. THEY COULD DO WHAT THEY WISHED."

ONE OF THE CONCERNS HAS TO DO WITH THE FEASIBILITY OF IBEX. COULD IT PROVE TO BE A \$500 MILLION DUD?

DOCUMENTS FROM THE IBEX FILE RAISE THE POSSIBILITY. IT

IS ALLEGED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IRAN IS BEING USED AS A TECHNOLOGICAL DUMPING GROUND FOR EQUIPMENT AND CONCEPTS THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND OTHER U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAVE FOUND IMPRACTICAL AND OVERLY SOPHISTICATED....

THESE DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION, WASTE AND OBSOLESCENCE IN OTHER U.S. PROJECTS IN IRAN HAVE BECOME A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN AND IRRITATION TO THE SHAH.

HE HAS BEEN PROTESTING FOR MONTHS TO U. S. AUTHORITIES AND AT THE SAME TIME HAS BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF MANY OF THE AMERICANS INVOLVED IN HIS COUNTRY'S MASSIVE ARMS BUILDUP. ON FEBRUARY 22, 1976, HE ORDERED GEN. TOUFANIAN TO SEND A SIX-PAGE LETTER OF COMPLAINTS TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD. HE WAS SO SUSPICIOUS OF LEAKS FROM THE AMERICANS THAT HE HAD THE DOCUMENT SENT BY WAY OF A U. S. DIPLOMATIC POUCH.

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REST OF ARTICLE DETAILS ACTIVITIES OF RICHARD HALLOCK SENT BY SCHLESINGER AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SHAH TO SERVE AS COUNTERWEIGHT TO HARD SALES TACTICS OF INDUSTRY AND U. S. MILITARY SERVICES. ARTICLE ALSO DESCRIBES SHAH'S DISSATISFACTION WITH ERIC VON MARBOD ADVOCACY OF US CORPORATE INTERESTS.

PRECEDING WAS A FRONT-PAGE ARTICLE

4. THE UNTOLD STORY OF CAMBODIA'S AGONY, WILLIAM SHAWCROSS. LITTLE IS HEARD OF CAMBODIA THESE DAYS--AND MOST OF THAT IS UNPLEASANT. CAMBODIA IS CRUSHED UNDER THE COMMUNIST KHMER ROUGE, WHO OVERTHREW THE PRO-WESTERN REGIME OF LON NOL IN APRIL, 1975. OFFICIALS AND OFFICERS OF THE OLD REGIME HAVE BEEN CLUBBED TO DEATH. REFUGEES STUMBLE OVER THE BORDERS INTO THAILAND AND VIETNAM WITH OTHER TALES OF HORROR.

HOW DID THIS COME ABOUT?

(ARTICLE DESCRIBES EVENTS PRECEDING SIHANOUK OVERTHROW.)

WITHIN A MONTH, NORTH VIETNAMESE AND KHMER ROUGE TROOPS WERE MOVING OUT OF THE BORDER SANCTUARIES TOWARD PHNOM PENH. IN WASHINGTON, BOTH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE CIA WERE WARY OF DEEPENING THE U. S. INVOLVEMENT. "IT WOULD BE VERY RISKY TO TRY AND SOLVE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PROBLEM IN CAMBODIA BY FORCE," WROTE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE MARSHALL GREEN IN A MEMORANDUM TO KISSINGER AND SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS. A DETAILED ANALYSIS BY THE CIA'S OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WARNED THAT 'AN

EXPANDED ALLIED EFFORT COULD SERIOUSLY HANDICAP THE COMMUNISTS...BUT, HOWEVER, SUCCESSFUL, IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT PREVENT THEM FROM CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE IN SOME FORM."

THE CIA ANALYSIS NEVER REACHED THE WHITE HOUSE. CIA DI-UNCLASSIFIED

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RECTOR RICHARD HELMS REFUSED TO PASS IT ON. HELMS ALREADY KNEW THAT NIXON AND KISSINGER HAD DECIDED TO INVADE CAMBODIA--AND WANTED NO ADVICE AGAINST IT.

ON APRIL 29-30, 1970, SOME 30,000 AMERICAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS DROVE ACROSS THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. THE U.S. MISSION IN PHNOM PENH LEARNED OF IT FROM THE VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCAST OF NIXON'S TELEVISED SPEECH. THE CHARGE, LLOYD RIVES, TOOK THE NEWS TO A STUNNED LON NOL. RIVES WAS ORDERED BY WASHINGTON TO FAKE A TELEGRAM FROM LON NOL REQUESTING THE INVASION. HE DRAFTED ONE AND TOOK IT TO LON NOL, WHO SIGNED IT.

"STROKING" LON NOL: LON NOL WAS AN UNLIKELY WAR LEADER. AT MOMENTS OF CRISIS, A STRAIN OF MYSTICISM, NEVER FAR FROM THE SURFACE, WOULD OVERWHELM HIM.

(ARTICLE GOES ON TO DETAIL LON NOL'S INCOMPETENECE.)

LON NOL WAS NOT, IN OTHER WORDS, AN IDEAL CHOICE. YET IN THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY, WHILE AMERICAN OPINION REELED FROM THE INVASION ONLY DAYS BEFORE, NIXON SENT COL. ALEXANDER HAIG TO PHNOM PENH TO ASSESS NOT WHETHER THIS IMPROBABLY FIGURE SHOULD BE AIDED, BUT HOW.

HAIG'S VISIT WAS CRUCIAL: IT ESTABLISHED THE RELATIONSHIP TO COME BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND LON NOL, BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE U. S. MISSION, BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND REALITY. EFFICIENT, HARDLINE, UNQUESTIONINGLY LOYAL, HAIG WAS THEN KISSINGER'S ASSISTANT. THE PHNOM PENH TRIP WAS HIS FIRST SOLO MISSION OF IMPORTANCE. HE DID NOT LIKE LLOYD RIVES.

RIVES ANGERED HAIG BY RESISTING A PLAN TO INSTALL IN HIS UNCLASSIFIED

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MISSION A MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM--THE TECHNICIANS TO BE OUTSIDE RIVES' CONTROL. AND RIVES' UNCONCEALED DOUBTS ABOUT THE COURSE OF EVENTS UNDERCUT HAIG'S GUNG-HO ENTHUSIASM.

HAIG WOULD NOT EVEN LET RIVES GO WITH HIM TO LON NOL. BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT LATER LEARNED WHAT HAD HAPPENED.

HAIG FOUND LON NOL IN AN EMOTIONAL STATE. REPEATEDLY, HAIG HAD TO ASSURE HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPLY ALL HE NEEDED TO DRIVE OUT THE COMMUNISTS. REPEATEDLY, LON NOL WAS TOLD HE HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT NIXON. FINALLY, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL ACCOUNTS, HAIG TOLD LON NOL THAT HE COULD BY PASS THE U. S. MISSION AND DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE WHITE HOUSE.

HAIG'S WAS THE FIRST OF WHAT BECAME KNOWN AS "STROKING MISSIONS." OVER AND OVER, IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, THE WHITE HOUSE WOULD IGNORE THE REALITIES ON THE GROUND-- AND THE U.S. MISSION'S PERCEPTIONS OF THEM--AND SEND HAIG, SPIRO AGNEW, JOHN CONNALLY AND OTHER BARONS TO "STROKE" LON NOL, CONVINCE HIM OF HIS "SUCSESSES" AND OF HIS UNREMITTING SUPPORT IN NIXON'S WHITE HOUSE.

(ARTICLE GOES ON TO DESCRIBE JONATHAN LADD'S ROLE.)

A CAREER RUINED: THE COROLLARY OF WHITE HOUSE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE WAR WAS THE ERASING OF THE ALREADY BLURRED LINE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY.

RICHARD HELMS OF THE CIA HAD GRASPED THIS FAIRLY SWIFTLY. OUT IN PHNOM PENH, LLOYD RIVES WAS SLOWER TO CATCH ON. THE VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW IN AUGUST, 1970, VIRTUALLY RUINED RIVES' CAREER.....

(ARTICLES GOES ON TO DESCRIBE AGNEW'S VISIT.)

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EVERYWHERE IN PHNOM PENH, AGNEW WAS SURROUNDED BY A SQUAD OF U. S. SECRET SERVICE MEN TOTING SUBMACHINE GUNES. WHEN ONE SAT WITH HIS GUN OPENLY TRAINED ON THE CAMBODIAN HEAD OF STATE'S BACK, RIVES PROTESTED. THE SECRET SERVICE COMPLAINED TO THE WHITE HOUSE. FIRST HAIG, NOW AGNEW. THE WHITE HOUSE ORDERED RIVES' DISMISSAL.

RIVES' COLLEAGUES PROTECTED HIM: HE WAS SIMPLY SHUNTED FOR TWO YEARS INTO THE BACKWATER OF AFRICAN RESEARCH. BUT SINCE HIS COLLEAGUES WERE CONVINCED THAT RIVES' SKEPTICISM HAD BEEN THE REAL CAUSE OF HIS DOWNFALL, THE LESSON WENT HOME: IT DID NOT PAY TO SPEAK YOUR MIND ON CAMBODIA.....

(ARTICLE GOES ON TO DESCRIBE DETERIORATION OF SITUATION AND VN PEACE AGREEMENT UNDER AMB. SWANK.)

ARTICLE 20 OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT SPECIFIED THAT FOREIGN COUNTRIES "SHALL PUT AN END TO ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS."

SO, FOR A BRIEF MOMENT, THINGS LOOKED OPTIMISTIC FOR CAMBODIA. IT WAS, AFTER ALL, A SIDESHOW FOR THE AMERICANS DURING THE VIETNAM TALKS, KISSINGER HAD MADE HIS ONLY, BRIEF VISIT TO CAMBODIA.

WHEN THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, KISSINGER ANNOUNCED "WE CAN SAY ABOUT CAMBODIA THAT IT IS OUR EXPECTATION THAT A DE FACTO CEASE-FIRE WILL COME INTO BEING OVER A PERIOD RELEVANT TO THE EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT." GIVEN THAT THE CORE OF THE AGREEMENT WAS U. S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM, KISSINGER SEEMED TO BE PREDICTING A PARALLEL DIS-ENGAGEMENT IN CAMBODIA.

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THE OUTSIDE WORLD DID NOT SEE A SECRET STATE DEPARTMENT EVALUATION OF THE NEWLY SIGNED AGREEMENT, POINTING OUT THAT THE OBLIGATION OF AMERICAN AND NORTH VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW FULLY FROM CAMBODIA WAS PURELY IN PRINCIPLE; ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD DEPEND "UPON THE TIMING OF AGREEMENTS AMONG THE CONTENDING PARTIES."

KISSINGER HAD SOME GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM. HE HAD SECRETLY WARNED HANOI THAT IT COULD NOT EXPECT U. S. RECONSTRUCTION AID--WHICH HAD BEEN GUARANTEED UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT--UNLESS IT FORCED A CEASE-FIRE IN CAMBODIA HANOI, AS WE SHALL SEE, DID THEN CUT KHMER ROUGE ARMS SUPPLIES. BUT KISSINGER FAILED TO SEE THAT, AS THAT HAPPENED, HANOI'S INFLUENCE OVER THE KHMER ROUGE WOULD DWINDLE. MORE IMPORTANT, HE TOOK NO STEPS EITHER TO

ESTABLISH HIS "DE FACTO CEASE-FIRE" OR TO INITIATE MORE FORMAL CAMBODIAN PEACE TALKS. ...

(ARTICLE DISCUSSES LON NOL'S SUSPENSION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.)

THE NEXT DAY, SIHANOUK REPLIED. THE KHMER ROUGE, HE SAID, WERE REEVALUATING THEIR POLICY. "IF THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ACT IN A FRIENDLY MANNER WITH AN INDEPENDENT AND NONALIGNED CAMBODIA, WE ARE PREPARED FOR A RAPID RECONCILIATION WITH WASHINGTON." AND, THOUGH LON NOL DISMISSED THE STATEMENT, THE INSURGENTS DID SLACKEN, THOUGH NOT CEASE, OPERATIONS.

BUT WHAT HAPPENED NOW? CLEARLY, SOME INITIATIVE WAS NEEDED. AND, BY GOOD FORTUNE, KISSINGER WAS GOING TO HANOI AND PEKING. SIHANOUK SAID THAT HE HOPED TO SEE HIM THEN, BUT ON FEB. 3, THE WHITE HOUSE REPLIED THAT KISSINGER HAD "NO PLANS TO SEE THE PRINCE DURING THE

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TRIP."

REBUFFED, SIHANOUK WITHDREW HIS OFFER ON FEB. 7. AFTER A LULL, THE CONFLICT ON THE GROUND HAD ALREADY BEEN REASSERTING ITSELF AND NOW THE BATTLE BEGAN IN EARNEST ONCE MORE. ON FEB. 8, THE AMERICAN BOMBING RESUMED.

IGNORING SIHANOUK: IT WOULD BE COMFORTING TO FIND IN THE GRIM EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED SOME COMMENSURATE MOTIVE, SOME INEXORABLE REQUIREMENT OF HIGH STRATEGY. NONE APPEARS.

THE ONLY EXPLANATION CAME FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, EMORY SWANK: THAT, GIVEN THE WEAKNESS OF THE U. S. ALLY, LON NOL, THE INITIATION OF PEACE MOVES "WOULD TO HENRY KISSINGER HAVE BEEN LEADING FROM WEAKNESS.".....

(ARTICLE DISCUSSES SIKHANOUK'S RELATIONSHIP TO KHMER ROUGE, DESTRUCTIVENESS OF US ROLE IN WAR.)

IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN CAMBODIA, SIHANOUK HAD TWO PERCEPTIONS, WHICH HE TRIED TO PRESS UPON WASHINGTON THROUGH EVERY INTERMEDIARY HE COULD FIND.

THE FIRST WAS THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE BETWEEN HIS

EXILE GOVERNMENT AND WASHINGTON. HE SAW NO CAUSE TO DEAL WITH LON NOL WHEN IT WAS ONLY U. S. AID THAT PROPPED HIM UP. SECONDLY, SIHANOUK TRIED TO CONVEY THAT THE KHMER ROUGE WERE NOT THE CREATURES OF HANOI. (THIS WAS CERTAINLY CORRECT. MOST NORTH VIETNAMESE FRONT-LINE UNITS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA BY MID-1972; THE REST OF THEIR DIRECT SUPPORT WAS WITHDRAWN IN EARLY 1973. TO KHMER ROUGE FURY, HANOI THEN BEGAN, IN PURSUIT OF ARTICLE 21, TO RESTRICT EVEN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION.)

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BUT WASHINGTON CONTINUED IGNORING SHIANOUK. FOR YEARS, SIHANOUK AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD GOT ON EACH OTHER'S NERVES, AND KISSINGER REGARDED HIM WITH CONTEMPT. AND THE CONTEMPT WAS SELF-FULFILLING: THE LONGER SIHANOUK WAS IGNORED BY WASHINGTON, THE LESS AUTHORITY HE HAD OVER HIS UNEASY ALLIES, THE KHMER ROUGE, OR IN PEKING.

FACED WITH THIS DILEMMA, WASHINGTON CONSTRUCTED ITS POLICY: LON NOL AND THE KHMER ROUGE (WITH SIHANOUK IF THEY WANTED HIM) SHOULD NEGOTIATE BETWEEN THEMSELVES....

(ARTICLE DESCRIBES DESTRUCTIVENESS OF BOMBING AND ROLE

OF FRENCH AMBASSADOR MONACH IN PEKING.)

SHOOTING THE DOVE: IN THE 14 MONTHS BETWEEN THE END OF THE BOMBING IN AUGUST, 1973. AND OCTOBER, 1974, KISSINGER MADE NOT ONE EFFORT TO END THE WAR AND DISREGARDED CAMBODIA. THIS WOULD BE HARD TO BELIEVE, WERE IT NOT FOR EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO CONGRESS. KISSINGER, OR COURSE, HAD OTHER CONCERNS IN THIS PERIOD: THE MIDDLE EAST WAR, THE OIL PRICE CRISIS, THE IMPENDING IMPEACHMENT OF NIXON. YET KISSINGER--HIS AMBITION TO SUPPLANT ROGERS AS SECRETARY OF STATE NOW ACHIEVED--STILL FOUND TIME TO PUNISH ONE OF THOSE WHO HAD DISAGREED WITH HIM OVER THE FATE OF CAMBODIA. KISSINGER WRECKED AMBASSADOR SWANK'S CAREER.

SWANK'S TOUR OF DUTY IN PHNOM PENH ENDED A FEW WEEKS AFTER THE BOMBING DID. HE LEFT A SADDENED MAN. SO LONG AS U. S. TROOPS HAD BEEN IN VIETNAM, SWANK HAD SUPPORTED U. S. POLICY. BUT BY THE SUMMER OF 1973, HE HAD COME TO THINK ANY SETTLEMENT BETTER THAN THE CONTINUING SLAUGHTER. "CAMBODIA IS INDOCHINA'S MOST USELESS WAR," HE SAID AT HIS FAREWELL PRESS CONFERENCE.

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KISSINGER DID NOT FORGIVE SWANK'S DOUBTS....

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(ARTICLE DESCRIBES AMB. SWANK'S SUBSEQUENT CAREER, AMB. DEAN'S APPOINTMENT).

BUT DEAN WAS REALISTIC; SOON HE SUGGESTED IN A CABLE THAT KISSINGER CONTACT KHMER ROUGE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF KHIEU SAMPHAN, WHO WAS THEN TRAVELING IN EUROPE. KISSINGER REFUSED. DEAN PERSISTED, COUCHING HIS ARGUMENT IN TERMS HE THOUGH KISSINGER MIGHT RESPECT. "WHAT DO WE HAVE TO LOSE?" HE WROTE. "WHATEVER HAPPENS IT WILL MAKE US LOOK GOOD IN CONGRESS AND IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD." KISSINGER WAS ADAMENT: NO.

BY JUNE, 1974, DEAN HAD REALIZED THAT, WHATEVER MARGINAL REFORMS MIGHT BE MADE IN LON NOL'S ARMY, ITS POSITION WOULD NEVER GREATLY IMPROVE. EVEN TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE WOULD NEED MASSIVE AID. DEAN THEREFORE SENT KISSINGER ANOTHER LONG PAPER, ARGUING: "TIME IS AGAINST US." THE UNITED STATES SHOULD OPT, HE SAID, FOR WHAT BECAME KNOWN AS "A CONTROLLED SOLUTION." MORE BLUNTLY, DEAN'S COLLEAGUES SAY HE WANTED A NEGOTIATED SURRENDER THAT WOULD ALLOW THE KHMER ROUGE TO ENTER PHNOM PENH WITHOUT FURTHER BLOODSHED.

ON AUG. 9, NIXON FINALLY RESIGNED. IN THE TURMOIL DEAN'S

PAPER WAS UNDERSTANDABLY LOST FROM VIEW.

BUT DEAN WAS PERSISTENT. AT THE END OF AUGUST, HE CAME TO WASHINGTON HIMSELF TO SEE IF A NEW PRESIDENT WOULD BRING NEW ATTITUDES. GERALD FORD DID NOT. KISSINGER WAS CONFIRMED IN HIS JOB, AND DEAN LARGELY WASTED HIS TIME. ONLY AS HE WAS ABOUT TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA DID HE AT LAST SEE KISSINGER, WHO MERELY SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HOW ACIIVELY UNCLASSIFIED

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HE PURSUED IT IS UNCLEAR. KISSINGER HAS SINCE HINTED THAT HE TRIED HARD. BUT AT THE TIME, DEAN'S CONSTANT CABLES ABOUT THE NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT IRRITATED HIM. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT "PROFESSOR DEAN'S LECTURES." BUT DEAN HAD THE SUPPORT OF PHILIP HABIB, THE NEW ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA....

(ARTICLE DESCRIBES GENESIS OF CAMBODIA MENTION IN MARTINIQUE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE).

ON APRIL 11, AFTER SIHANOUK HAD MADE CONTACT, THROUGH THE FRENCH, WITH THE U. S. MISSION IN PEKING, KISSINGER AT LAST AUTHORIZED AN OVERTUNE TO HIM. AT 5 P.M. THAT

DAY, JOHN HOLDRIGE, AN OFFICIAL FROM THE U. S. MISSION, MET WITH SIHANOUK'S CHIEF AIDE. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD DECIDED THAT ONLY SIHANOUK COULD END THE CRISIS. WOULD HE PLEASE ASK THE CHINESE FOR AN AIRCRAFT TO FLY HIM TO PHNOM PENH? THE UNITED STATES WOULD GUARANTEE TO REMAIN THERE UNTIL HE ARRIVED. ALL THE CONDITIONS WHICH KISSINGER HAD INSISTED UPON AT THE TIME OF THE MARTINIQUE PLAN WERE SUDDENTLY WAIVED.

BUT AT 5:30 THE NEXT MORNING, APRIL 12 HOLDRIDGE TOLD SIHANOUK'S AIDE THAT THE DEFENSE OF PHNOM PENH WAS IN FACT DEGENERATING SO FAST THAT THE U. S. EMBASSY WAS BEING CLOSED AT ONCE.....

(ARTICLE GOES ON TO DESCRIBE LAST DAYS OF PHNOM PENH.)

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5. SEPTTEL WITH ADDITIONAL NYTIMES' ARTICLE FOLLOWS.

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